Friday, October 11, 2019
A European Way of War
CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN REFORM A EUROPEAN WAY OF WAR Steven Everts, Lawrence Freedman, Charles Grant, Francois Heisbourg, Daniel Keohane and Michael O'Hanlon about the CER The Centre for European Reform is a think-tank devoted to improving the quality of the debate on the European Union. It is a forum for people with ideas from Britain and across the continent to discuss the many social, political and economic challenges facing Europe. It seeks to work with similar bodies in other European countries, North America and elsewhere in the world. The CER is pro-European but not uncritical.It regards European integration as largely bene? cial but recognises that in many respects the Union does not work well. The CER therefore aims to promote new ideas for reforming the European Union. A European way of war ? Director: CHARLES GRANT ADVISORY BOARD PERCY BARNEVIKÃ¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢ â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦.. Chairman, AstraZeneca CARL BILDTÃ¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦. Former Swedish Prime Minister and Chairman, Nordic Venture Networks ANTONIO BORGESÃ¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦..Former Dean of INSEAD NICK BUTLER (CHAIR)Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦.. Group Vice President, Strategy, BP p. l. c. LORD DAHRENDORF Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦ Former Warden of St AntonyÃ¢â¬â¢s College, Oxford & EU Commissioner VERNON ELLISÃ¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦.. International Chairman, Accenture RICHARD HAASSÃ¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â ¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦.. President, Council on Foreign Relations LORD HANNAYÃ¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦ Former Ambassador to the UN and the EU IAN HARGREAVESÃ¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Group Director of Corporate and Public Affairs, BAA plc LORD HASKINS OF SKIDBYÃ¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦ Former Chairman, Northern Foods FRANCOIS HEISBOURGÃ¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦ Director, Fondation pour la Recherche Strategique CATHERINE KELLEHERÃ¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦.. Visiting Research Professor, US Naval War College SIR JOHN KERRÃ¢â¬ ¦. Former Ambassador to the EU and US & former Permanent Under Secretary, FCO FIORELLA KOSTORIS PADOA SCHIOPPAÃ¢â¬ ¦.. Former President, Istituto di Studi e Analisi Economica RICHARD LAMBERTÃ¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦..Former Editor, Financial Times DAVID MARSHÃ¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦. Partner, Droege & Comp. AG DOMINIQUE MOISIÃ¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦ Senior Advisor, Institut Francais des Relations Internationales JOHN MONKSÃ¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦ General Secretary, ETUC DAME PAUL INE NEVILLE-JONESÃ¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦.. Chairman, QinetiQ p. l. c. WANDA RAPACZYNSKIÃ¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦. President of Management Board, Agora SA LORD SIMON OF HIGHBURYÃ¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦.Former Minister for Trade and Competitiveness in Europe PETER SUTHERLANDÃ¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦ Chairman, BP p. l. c. & Goldman Sachs International ADAIR TURNERÃ¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦Ã¢â¬ ¦.. Vice Chairman, Merrill Lynch Holdings Ltd. Steven Everts, Lawrence Freedman, Charles Grant, Francois Heisbourg, Daniel Keohane and Michael OÃ¢â¬â¢Hanlon Published by the Centre for European Reform (CER), 29 Tufton Street, London, SW1P 3QL Telephone + 44 20 7233 1199, Facsimile + 44 20 7233 1117, [emailÃ protected] org. uk, www. cer. org. uk Ã © CER MAY 2004 ? ISBN 1 901229 54 8ABOUT THE AUTHORS Steven Everts is a senior research fellow at the Centre for European Reform, and director of its transatlantic programme. His recent CER publications include Ã¢â¬ËEngaging Iran: a test case for EU foreign policyÃ¢â¬â¢ (March 2004); Ã¢â¬ËThe EU and the Middle East: a call for actionÃ¢â¬â¢ (January 2003); and Ã¢â¬ËShaping a credible EU foreign policyÃ¢â¬â¢ (February 2002). Lawrence Freedman is professor of war studies and vice principal (Research) at KingÃ¢â¬â¢s College, London. He is the author of a number of books on Cold War history and contemporary security issues, most recently Ã¢â¬ËDeterrenceÃ¢â¬â¢ (Polity, 2004).He is also of? cial historian of the Falklands campaign. Charles Grant has been director of the Centre for European Reform since 1998. He was previously defence editor and Bru ssels correspondent of The Economist. His most recent CER publication is Ã¢â¬ËTransatlantic rift: how to bring the two sides togetherÃ¢â¬â¢ (July 2003). Francois Heisbourg is director of the Paris-based Fondation pour la Recherche Strategique, and chairman of both the International Institute of Strategic Studies and the Geneva Centre for Security Policy. He is also a member of the CERÃ¢â¬â¢s advisory board.Daniel Keohane is the research fellow for security and defence policy at the Centre for European Reform. He previously worked at the EU Institute for Security Studies in Paris, and at the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, in Washington DC. He is the author of Ã¢â¬ËThe EU and armaments co-operationÃ¢â¬â¢ (CER December 2002). Michael OÃ¢â¬â¢Hanlon is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. He previously worked for the US Congress. In his ten years at Brookings, he has written on US defence strategy and the defence budget, the Ko sovo war, missile defence, military technology, space warfare and homeland security.AUTHORSÃ¢â¬â¢ ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The authors would like to thank EDS for their support of this project. They also owe particular thanks to Kate Meakins for designing this publication, and to Aurore Wanlin and John Springford for their research help. In addition, the CER is grateful to the German Marshall Fund of the US for supporting the CERÃ¢â¬â¢s transatlantic programme. Charles Grant would like to thank the following for their help: Victoria Billing, Gavin Cook, Marta Dassu, Paul Johnston, Edwina Moreton and Simon Webb. ? Copyright of this publication is held by the Centre for European Reform.You may not copy, reproduce, republish or circulate in any way the content from this publication except for your own personal and noncommercial use. Any other use requires the prior written permission of the Centre for European Reform. Contents About the authors AuthorsÃ¢â¬â¢ acknowledgements Foreword 1 I ntroduction Steven Everts and Daniel Keohane 2 Can the EU develop an effective military doctrine? Lawrence Freedman 3 The Ã¢â¬ËEuropean Security StrategyÃ¢â¬â¢ is not a security strategy Francois Heisbourg 4 The American way of war: the lessons for Europe Michael OÃ¢â¬â¢Hanlon 5 Conclusion: the signi? ance of European defence Charles Grant 55 41 27 13 1 Foreword EDS has worked for many years in partnership with the ministries of defence and the armed forces on both sides of the Atlantic. We currently have colleagues stationed in the Middle East, in support of UK forces. We are, therefore, delighted to be supporting this new CER work, Ã¢â¬ËA European way of warÃ¢â¬â¢. In the best traditions of the CER, it has brought together key experts from both sides of the Atlantic to debate the future of European defence. What is striking about the contributions is the high level of agreement on what Europe needs to do.They avoid the stereotyping of the US-Europe relationship as a divi sion of labour in which Ã¢â¬â as Francois Heisbourg says Ã¢â¬â the US Ã¢â¬Ëkicks in doorsÃ¢â¬â¢ and the EU Ã¢â¬Ëcleans the houseÃ¢â¬â¢. All agree that Europe must urgently improve its military capabilities if it is to translate the goal of Ã¢â¬Å"effective multilateralismÃ¢â¬ from rhetoric into reality. It must reduce the scale of its land armies and the number of duplicate equipment programmes. Europe must begin investing in technologies and equipment that complement rather than duplicate US investment. Equally, the authors highlight the lessons and experiences which Europe can offer to the US in he prosecution of unconventional warfare, for example in deterring insurgents and terrorists. These essays provide a timely reminder of how the US and Europe are united by a common need to tackle global terrorism and proliferation, as well as their underlying causes. They all agree on the need for Europe to become a more effective military power and to take more responsibi lity for its own backyard. But they debunk some of the myths associated with the debate. All agree that Europe need not spend as much as the US or copy AmericaÃ¢â¬â¢s force structure and doctrine in every respect.As Steven Everts and Daniel Keohane stress, a European way of war does not mean either the creation of Ã¢â¬Å"an EU army under Brussels control, or the end of the NATO military allianceÃ¢â¬ . This work is a valuable contribution to the current debate on the future of European defence. Its prescriptions on how Europe can play an effective military role in world affairs deserve to be taken up by EuropeÃ¢â¬â¢s leaders. Graham Lay Managing Director EDS Defence 1 Introduction Steven Everts and Daniel Keohane The idea of a Ã¢â¬ËEuropean way of warÃ¢â¬â¢ is controversial. Many defence commentators and of? ials assume that the phrase is a metaphor for two, equally undesirable, outcomes: an EU army under the control of Brussels and the end of NATO. The reality is that the EU will not have its own army for decades to come Ã¢â¬â if ever. Nor will NATOÃ¢â¬â¢s status as EuropeÃ¢â¬â¢s pre-eminent defence organisation change any time soon. Most discussions on the future of European defence, when cast in such terms, generate more heat than light. There is, however, a real need for Europeans to think more creatively about what kind of defence capability they want. What sorts of missions do they envisage? And how do they expect their forces to operate in the future?European governments need to make a tough assessment of the additional tasks they want their armies to perform, alongside traditional peacekeeping. Clearly, Europe cannot hope to copy the American approach to warfare, with its heavy emphasis on technology and Ã¢â¬Ëfull spectrum dominanceÃ¢â¬â¢ Ã¢â¬â the ability to defeat any enemy in every conceivable category of weaponry. The budgetary constraints are simply too great. But equally, the Europeans should not try to emulate the American sÃ¢â¬â¢ doctrine or force structure in their entirety Ã¢â¬â even if they had unlimited money Ã¢â¬â because Europe has very different trategic priorities. For a range of historical and political reasons, Europeans do not share all of AmericaÃ¢â¬â¢s security policy goals. And yet American doctrine, tactics and capabilities remain the benchmark for nearly all European discussions on defence policy. 2 A European way of war Introduction 3 Such constant, and mostly unfavourable, comparisons with the US tend to create a harmful sense of impotence and resignation among European defence of? cials. The European countries have very disparate military traditions, and they have great difficulties finding money for new defence equipment.Despite these problems, can European governments develop more innovative and ambitious defence policies? The answer is yes, but only if European defence ministries develop their own distinctive approach to warfare. European Council, Brussels, Ã¢â¬ËA se cure Europe in a better world Ã¢â¬â European Security StrategyÃ¢â¬â¢, December 12th 2003. 1 warfare: peacekeeping, nation-building and counter-insurgency. Thus the Pentagon could learn a lot from European experiences and ways of operating. Our American contributor, Michael OÃ¢â¬â¢Hanlon, argues that the Pentagon is already learning fast from its post-con? ct experience in Iraq. He stresses that stabilisation missions should not be seen as less important than those involving high-intensity warfare. And he argues that the greatest threat to the health of the US military in the coming years is insuf? cient numbers of troops to help with nationbuilding. He adds that the dif? culties that US troops face when working with technologically backward European allies are a serious but secondary problem. Freedman and OÃ¢â¬â¢Hanlon agree that both American and European armed forces need a better mixture of regular warfighting capabilities and peacekeeping skills.But politicians in Europ e should take note Ã¢â¬â and take heart Ã¢â¬â that such improvements need not mean massive increases in defence budgets. The 2 Based on estimates governments of the EU-25 collectively spend in the SIPRI Yearbook approximately S180 billion ($220 billion) a year on 2003, Ã¢â¬ËArmaments, defence, which is a signi? cant amount of money. 2 disarmaments and For all its weaknesses, the EU remains the worldÃ¢â¬â¢s international securityÃ¢â¬â¢, Oxford University second highest spender after the US, which devotes Press, Oxford, 2003. some S330 billion ($400 billion) to defence.OÃ¢â¬â¢Hanlon recommends that over the next decade EU governments should spend 10 per cent of their annual defence budgets on speci? c types of equipment. These include long-range transport planes and ships, unmanned aerial vehicles, and precision-guided missiles. To pay for this, he argues, defence ministries should cut their manpower by a quarter, and focus on developing highly trained combat troops. If defence ministries followed this plan, by 2015 Europe would have more than 200,000 high-quality, professional soldiers, able to operate at short notice anywhere around the globe.At the moment the US can send about 400,000 ground troops The European security strategy, prepared by EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana, provides a good basis for thinking about a European approach to warfare. 1 But, as Francois Heisbourg points out in this pamphlet, that security strategy contains some glaring gaps. He argues that the EU should do three things in particular: draw up a complementary strategy for the EUÃ¢â¬â¢s internal security; audit the impact of European development programmes on security in recipient countries; and start working on an EU military doctrine.In his essay, Lawrence Freedman questions the utility of an EU military doctrine, and concludes that it would be redundant. He thinks it unlikely that 25 European governments could ever agree on a meaningful doctrine. But Britain a nd France could take the lead, he argues, in de? ning a distinctly Ã¢â¬ËEuropeanÃ¢â¬â¢ military contribution to dealing with global security problems. London and Paris are the only European capitals that have run their own military operations in recent years, sometimes in very demanding environments.And, unlike the other Europeans, the French and the British already have highly developed military doctrines of their own. Freedman also argues that, even though the US is the worldÃ¢â¬â¢s predominant military power, European soldiers are often better than American ones at many of the missions that dominate contemporary 4 A European way of war 5 around the world, out of a total of about 650,000. But presently the EU-25 can barely deploy 85,000, out of a total of 1. 2 million ground soldiers. 3 From both a defence plannerÃ¢â¬â¢s point of view, and that of the taxpayer, EuropeÃ¢â¬â¢s armies need 3 These ? ures do not include air force or urgent reform. navy personnel. The total n umber of the US armed forces is approximately 1. 4 million people. The 25 EU governments have almost 2 million people in their total armed forces. Figures based on estimates in the Ã¢â¬ËThe Military Balance 2003-2004Ã¢â¬â¢, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London 2004. Recent developments in Brussels Heisbourg, Freedman and OÃ¢â¬â¢Hanlon all agree that in principle a European approach to warfare is a good idea, provided three basic conditions are met: ?EuropeÃ¢â¬â¢s two pre-eminent military powers, Britain and France, must take the lead in de? ning a European approach to war. Some EU governments may balk at having to follow an approach that would be de? ned to a large extent by British and French doctrine. However, Europe is better off with a sound military doctrine than a meaningless political compromise. In their approach to warfare, Europeans should learn from the US approach, and from American experiences in places such as Iraq and Afghanistan. European arm ies should be able to work well with American soldiers.However, EuropeÃ¢â¬â¢s armies do not have to copy US forces in every respect. European defence ministries need to retain their traditional peacekeeping skills, while simultaneously building up their war-fighting prowess. The EU needs to develop the internal aspects of its security and defence policy. In particular, European governments have to think about how to join up the various policy instruments which they need in the fight against global terrorism. EU governments need to ensure that their law enforcement, foreign and defence policies work together more effectively.The good news is that NATO and the EU are already taking steps that will help their members to develop a European approach to warfare. At NATOÃ¢â¬â¢s 2002 Prague summit, President Bush called on the Europeans to increase their military might by creating a NATO Response Force (NRF). European governments followed his lead, approving a plan for a force of 21,000 elite troops, backed by supporting air and sea components, to be ready by 2006. This force will enable NATO to engage in a serious shooting war, in addition to its current peacekeeping work.By the end of 2003, NATO governments had already committed 9,000 troops to the response force, including 1,700 French soldiers. The NRF will be mainly European: the US accounts for only 300 (3 per cent) of the troops so far committed. 4 WashingtonÃ¢â¬â¢s message to its allies has been clear: Europe must increase its ability to undertake tough war-? ghting tasks if NATO is to remain central to US defence policy. NATOÃ¢â¬â¢s Response Force is goading the Europeans to prepare some of their troops for the most demanding types of military mission. 4 Spain is the biggest contributor to the NRF, with 2,200 troops.Germany is contributing 1,100 soldiers. See Luke Hill, Ã¢â¬ËAlliance launches triservice rapid Response ForceÃ¢â¬â¢, JaneÃ¢â¬â¢s Defence Weekly, October 22nd 2003. ? ? In February 20 04, the British, French and German governments proposed that the EU should be able to deploy nine Ã¢â¬Ëbattle groupsÃ¢â¬â¢, each consisting of 1,500 troops, and deployable within two weeks. Each battle group would be able to draw on extensive air and naval assets, including transport and logistical support. The rationale for these EU combat units is to give the UN the rapid reaction capability that it currently lacks. The UN usually manages to ? d peacekeepers who can police a cease? re or peace accord. But it often cannot ? nd troops available to form an intervention force. It needs to be able to draw on a few battalions which are ready and able to ? y into a con? ict zone and impose peace. For example, the UN was unable to intervene quickly enough in East Timor in 1999. The Bush administration is unlikely to provide the UN with US forces for this kind of task. Currently the United States has only two 6 A European way of war Introduction 7 See http://www. un. org/ Depts/dpko/dp ko/ contributors/Countries SummaryFeb2004. df. 5 soldiers involved in UN-run peacekeeping operations (out of a total of 42,000 soldiers, of which 3,650 are from the EU-25). 5 If the US is unwilling to provide peacekeepers, it is even less likely to make elite forces available for UN interventions. But the EU could be willing to help the UN: countries such as Britain and France have highly trained forces which can move into a war-zone at short notice. And European governments care much more than the US does about the UNÃ¢â¬â¢s ability to act in geographical areas that may not be of fundamental strategic importance.This is why the EU sent a small UN-mandated intervention force to Bunia in Congo in June 2003. And in April 2004 the EU considered the possibility of sending a UN-backed intervention force to the Dafur region of Sudan, where more than 650,000 people had ? ed killings, rape and looting by Arab militias. EU defence ministers agreed to the battle group initiative at their me eting in April 2004. They now have until 2007 to establish these forces Ã¢â¬â and may do so in three ways. First, a government could put together a national battle group.Only France and Britain could do this easily, although Germany, Spain and Italy should be able to develop their own combat units. Second, relatively large countries Ã¢â¬â such as Sweden and the Netherlands Ã¢â¬â could become lead or Ã¢â¬ËframeworkÃ¢â¬â¢ nations for a battle group. Smaller countries would then supply some troops or equipment to plug gaps that the lead country could not ? ll. The third option would be for several countries to come together to form truly multinational units, similar to the Strasbourg-based Eurocorps, which unites soldiers from Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and Spain.For a smaller country which does not want to Ã¢â¬Ëplug intoÃ¢â¬â¢ a particular lead nation, a multinational unit might be politically more appealing. For example, the Nordic and Baltic countries coul d decide to form a Baltic battle group. But multinational battle groups need not be regional. The EUÃ¢â¬â¢s non-aligned countries, for example, might want to form their own. Austria, Finland and Ireland are of similar military strength, and they could ? nd that co-operating with fellow neutrals rather than NATO members would avoid embarrassing questions regarding their neutral status.In any case the creation of these battle groups Ã¢â¬â like the NATO Response Force Ã¢â¬â should help Europeans to think more alike on how they conduct warfare. Moreover, this effort should reinforce NATOÃ¢â¬â¢s Response Force: the same troops would be available to the EU and NATO. During the summer of 2004, they EU will set up a new agency. The Ã¢â¬Ëdefence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments agencyÃ¢â¬â¢ will try to do two things, both of which will help the Europeans to develop a common approach to defence. It will seek to improve European military capabilities and to enhance armaments co-operation among the member-states.Unlike a typical national armaments agency, this new body will not have a procurement budget. So a better short description would be to call it a Ã¢â¬Ëcapabilities agencyÃ¢â¬â¢, since it will bring together the separate worlds of research, development and procurement. The agencyÃ¢â¬â¢s most important role will be political, in assessing member-statesÃ¢â¬â¢ progress towards meeting their capability commitments. Over the last few years, the EuropeansÃ¢â¬â¢ progress towards modernising and re-equipping their armies has been painfully slow.In 2002, EU governments agreed to a Ã¢â¬ËEuropean capabilities action planÃ¢â¬â¢ (ECAP), which committed them to acquiring various sorts of equipment, such as transport planes and precision-guided missiles. The agency will evaluate and report annually on the member-statesÃ¢â¬â¢ progress towards meeting these commitments. At present, the agency looks set to keep these reports confidential. That would be a shame. If those reports were made public, the agency could Ã¢â¬Ëname and shameÃ¢â¬â¢ the member-states which renege on pledges, and thus put them under pressure to deliver. 8 A European way of war Introduction 9Finally, European governments are due to reach agreement on an EU constitution in June 2004. This will probably include articles on Ã¢â¬Ëstructured co-operationÃ¢â¬â¢, EU jargon for a process that allows a small group of member-states to move forward in the area of defence. Given that EU countries have, and will always have, very different military capabilities, closer co-operation amongst a smaller group makes sense. Quite apart from the much-documented transatlantic gap, there is also a large capabilities gulf between EU member-states Ã¢â¬â a gulf that will widen with the accession of ten new members in May 2004. A revised version of the draft protocol listing the criteria for joining Ã¢â¬Ëstructured co-operationÃ¢â¬â¢ can be fo und at http://ue. eu. int/igcpdf/en/03/c g00/cg00057-re01. en03. pdf. Ã¢â¬â and demanding nature Ã¢â¬â of future missions. The EU undertook its ? rst military missions in Macedonia and Congo in 2003. These experiences have already helped defence ministries to understand which kinds of equipment they need most urgently, and what types of skills their troops should develop. Towards the end of 2004, the EU is due to take over the peacekeeping in Bosnia from NATO: this mission will be extremely dif? ult, including, for example, the hunt for the indicted Bosnian Serb general, Radovan Karadzic. Much more than the Congo or Macedonia operations, Bosnia will be a crucial test of the EUÃ¢â¬â¢s military mettle. The enlargement of the EU brings it closer to the arc of instability that runs around its eastern, south-eastern and southern ? anks. Romania and Bulgaria are hoping to join the EU in 2007, while Turkey, Croatia and other countries of the Western Balkans are likely to enter at a later stage. The EU will therefore have many weak and malfunctioning states on its borders.It is bound to become more involved in countries such as Belarus, Moldova and Georgia. Across the Atlantic, US priorities will remain focused on countries such as Iraq, Iran and North Korea, and con? icts such as China-Taiwan and India-Pakistan. Washington will be reluctant to become too involved in con? icts around the EUÃ¢â¬â¢s eastern and southern borders. The EU will need to develop a more effective set of policies for stabilising North Africa, the Balkans and the countries that lie between the Union and Russia. Many of these policies will involve trade, aid and political dialogue.But EU strategy towards its nearabroad will also have to include a military component. Europeans should not expect the US to put out ? res in their own backyard. After all, the principal rationale for the Anglo-French initiative at St Malo in 1998 Ã¢â¬â which begat the European Security and Defence Policy Ã ¢â¬â was to improve the EUÃ¢â¬â¢s poor performance in coping with the Balkan crises of the 1990s. The EUÃ¢â¬â¢s efforts to tackle con? icts in its near abroad may require more than Ã¢â¬ËmereÃ¢â¬â¢ peacekeeping. For example, if the delicateThat said, the current wording of the draft constitution sets targets for participation in the avant-garde which are relatively easy to meet. For example, the draft says that one of the criteria for participation is to supply by 2007 all or part of a combat unit that can be deployed in between ? ve and thirty days. 6 In fact, these combat units are the same types of force as those envisaged in the Ã¢â¬Ëbattle groupsÃ¢â¬â¢ plan that EU defence ministers approved in April 2004. However, some member-states will probably stay out of the structured co-operation, because they lack the assets or the ambition to take part.The defence inner circle will in some respects resemble the eurozone: some countries remain outside because they do not s atisfy the criteria, and others because they choose to do so. Structured co-operation will help the emergence of a European approach to warfare: like the NRF and the battle groups, the concept encourages other countries to emulate what the British and French armed forces do. The transatlantic case for a European way of war Innovations such as the NATO Response Force and the EU battle groups should, together with some institutional innovations, enhance EuropeÃ¢â¬â¢s military clout.But probably the most important factor driving military reform in Europe will be the growing number 10 A European way of war Introduction 11 situation in Kosovo turned into a civil war, the EU should be ready to intervene with forces that could separate the warring factions. In such situations, British soldiers would be fighting alongside those from France, Germany, Italy and Spain, but not necessarily with American troops. If the Europeans were able to undertake that kind of robust military intervention autonomously, transatlantic relations would benefit. For the Pentagon would have one less region to worry about.Furthermore, the more effective the EuropeansÃ¢â¬â¢ military prowess, the more likely is the US to use NATO not only for peacekeeping but also for high-intensity interventions. The future of EU defence policy All the authors of this pamphlet are worried about the risk of a transatlantic division of labour Ã¢â¬â namely the idea that Europe should do the peacekeeping and America ? ght the wars. But they all reject that notion, both as a description of the present and as a prescription for the future. The experience of Iraq has already forced the US to rethink its approach to post-con? ict operations.Having sometimes sneered at them, the Pentagon is now learning that peacekeeping, nation-building, and counter-insurgency should play a larger role in its military doctrine. Meanwhile, as the EU takes on more military missions, its defence ministries are themselves engaged i n a learning process. They are starting to see that they will need more sophisticated equipment, and be prepared for serious combat missions. They know that they will not always be able to count on the US to do the war-? ghting for them. It is true that the US and Europe currently have very different doctrines and priorities.But experiences on the ground will probably encourage both sides to address their respective weaknesses: post-con? ict stabilisation for the US and war-? ghting for the Europeans. In the long run this may lead Ã¢â¬â to some extent Ã¢â¬â to doctrinal convergence. European soldiers already conduct peacekeeping operations very differently from American troops. They expend less effort on force protection, they fraternise more with locals and they are more reluctant to unleash ? re-power. Europeans will also, inevitably, fight their wars differently from the Americans.Given their budgetary constraints, European defence ministries have no choice but to focus les s than the Pentagon does on sophisticated technology and airpower, and more on the role of ground forces. But these differences of emphasis should not prevent the Europeans from defeating most of their prospective enemies. When the EU mounts an autonomous combat operation, it is likely to be against a small or medium-sized power with weak air defences. The Europeans do not plan to ? ght any large and wellequipped adversaries on their own. In such cases, European soldiers would ? ght alongside American troops.Finally, the rapid evolution of EU internal security policy will affect defence policy. The March 2004 bombings in Madrid con? rmed the ability of al-Qaeda-style terrorist groups to strike at Europe. In order to track these groups, EU governments will have to piece together information from a variety of sources. They have pledged to step up intelligence-sharing, and in March 2004 they appointed Gijs de Vries as the UnionÃ¢â¬â¢s ? rst anti-terrorism Ã¢â¬ËtsarÃ¢â¬â¢. Since t he terrorist threat comes from both within and outside the EU, the member-states can no longer afford to maintain 7 See Daniel Keohane the traditional distinction etween external and and Adam Townsend, internal security. 7 In the most extreme cases, EU Ã¢â¬ËA joined-up EU security policyÃ¢â¬â¢, CER countries may wish to deploy force against a Bulletin, December terrorist group that is based abroad, or against a 2003 Ã¢â¬â January 2004. state that harbours terrorists. European defence policy is developing fast Ã¢â¬â and a more distinctive European approach to warfare is bound to emerge in coming years. However, such an approach is Ã¢â¬â paradoxically Ã¢â¬â more likely to develop in NATO than in the EU itself. For most European defence ministries, NATO will continue to be the principal multinational 2 A European way of war military organisation. That is not only because NATO is a military alliance Ã¢â¬â which the EU is not Ã¢â¬â but also because of NATOÃ¢â¬â¢s large and experienced military headquarters. More than 2,000 people work at NATOÃ¢â¬â¢s strategic headquarters (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe Ã¢â¬â known as SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium, while the EU military staff in Brussels has fewer than 200 people. Moreover, NATO has regional command headquarters in Naples (Italy) and Brunssum (the Netherlands), as well as a Ã¢â¬ËtransformationÃ¢â¬â¢ headquarters in Norfolk (US), which focuses speci? ally on reforming NATOÃ¢â¬â¢s armies. Put simply, European armies are reforming principally because of their collaboration in NATO, rather than the EU. The best example of this reform process is the NATO Response Force. Britain, France, Spain and Germany are See Kori Schake, leading the European contribution to this force, Ã¢â¬ËConstructive duplication: reducing EU reliance on US while American participation is only symbolic. military assetsÃ¢â¬â¢, CER, Thus NATO is playing its part in promoting a January 2002. She proposed mo re ambitious but distinctly Ã¢â¬ËEuropean way that the Europeans develop of warÃ¢â¬â¢.The irony is that the NATO Response a Ã¢â¬Ëstrike forceÃ¢â¬â¢, similar to Force was an American idea, which the the NATO Response Force Europeans have enthusiastically embraced. 8 that governments agreed to 8 2 Can the EU develop an effective military doctrine? Lawrence Freedman Can the EU develop an effective military doctrine which would de? ne the procedures to guide armed forces in future con? icts? EU governments have very different military strengths and diverse attitudes towards the use of military force. Those differences mean that the EU would produce a dysfunctional military doctrine, if it tried to create one.However, either acting together or separately, EU armies could make a distinctively Ã¢â¬ËEuropeanÃ¢â¬â¢ contribution to contemporary military operations. Britain and France should take the lead in de? ning that contribution. Their armed forces are the most capable and ex perienced in Europe, and have therefore had the opportunity to develop military doctrines that have been tested in the most dangerous types of operation. Any European military effort has to be compared with American military power. The US is in an unassailable position for winning conventional wars, as it did in Iraq in the spring of 2003.However, the problem of insurgents in Iraq has illustrated the extent to which the US has a dysfunctional military doctrine for unconventional warfare. Europeans should therefore not be obsessed with matching US military prowess. EuropeÃ¢â¬â¢s conventional capabilities should be suf? cient to cope with most prospective con? icts, especially since the cases where they might ? ght wars without the Americans would be rare. Unconventional warfare has become the most signi? cant and demanding form of military operation, and in this area the Americans have a lot to learn from the Europeans. et up in November 2002. In the coming years, European governme nts should strengthen their military clout and conduct more ambitious autonomous military operations. But they should also improve the ability of their soldiers to work alongside Americans. As NATO evolves and reforms, the EUÃ¢â¬â¢s security and defence policy will reap the bene? ts. Those who see the ESDP and NATO as competing and mutually exclusive concepts Ã¢â¬â and there are a few such people, in some parts of the Pentagon and the French foreign ministry Ã¢â¬â are living in the past.NATO and EU defence policy will sink or swim together, and on current trends they will swim. 14 Can the EU develop an effective military doctrine? 15 An EU military doctrine would be dysfunctional Countries often develop reputations for conducting their military campaigns in accordance with their national character. On this basis, northern Europeans would be cool and calculating, and southern Europeans romantic and impetuous, while the British would be pragmatic and stubborn. In practice, how ever, geo-strategic considerations are the biggest in? uence on national military doctrines.A cursory glance at 20th century military campaigns backs up this point. In the 1960s, the Israelis knew they had to seize the initiative against Egypt, Jordan and Syria by striking ? rst; if they had waited until they were attacked they would have been swamped. In the 1940s, the Russians could depend on territorial space and population mass to defend against the invading German army, while the Germans wanted to make the most of their qualitative advantages Ã¢â¬â such as their superior equipment Ã¢â¬â before the quantitative disadvantages began to tell.For maritime powers such as Britain and the US, the natural instinct has been to project sea and air power from a distance, and to rely on allies to carry out the bulk of land warfare. To be relevant and effective, a military doctrine should draw on a view of the world and its problems; make assessments of available military capabilities (including those of allies and enemies); and add precise ideas about strategy and tactics for the armed forces to follow. Thus, a doctrine should provide a framework in which armed forces can train, plan, conduct exercises, and generally work together in a mutually reinforcing way.The best doctrines orientate armed forces for the future, so that soldiers recognise the situations in which they will find themselves and know how to act. A commanderÃ¢â¬â¢s orders should be clear and well understood by his or her soldiers. By the same token, bad doctrine will lead to surprises and disorientation. In the worst circumstances, major adaptations to the organisation of the armed forces and the conduct of military operations will be required, even in the midst of a war going badly. A doctrine emanates rom a political process, involving ministries, agencies, and armed services Ã¢â¬â so any doctrinal changes will require negotiation between those disparate groups. Military doctrine, therefo re, reflects the preferences of powerful voices within government and the armed forces, as well as the concerns of key allies. One consequence of a complex political process involving a range of competing interests may be a dysfunctional doctrine. The risk of dysfunction grows during a prolonged period of peace, which tends to spare doctrine from critical scrutiny.Only regular experience with combat and the ultimate empirical test of war provide defence ministries with constant reality checks. The risk of a dysfunctional EU doctrine is high, mainly because it would require 25 governments and their respective defence establishments to compromise. If EU governments did agree on a common military doctrine, it would stem from a determination to demonstrate political unity Ã¢â¬â and not from the need for a doctrine that would provide effective guidance in an actual conflict.Furthermore, European governments have not yet developed a very successful EU foreign policy. And such a foreign policy is a precondition for EU success in the military sphere. No European soldiers will be deployed on EU military missions if the UnionÃ¢â¬â¢s governments cannot agree on their political objectives. The impact of having several governments negotiate strategy documents, whether in the EU or NATO, is to render those documents more bland and vague. The European Security Strategy, which EU leaders approved in December 2003, illustrates that point (see Francois HeisbourgÃ¢â¬â¢s chapter).Furthermore, these political processes have become even more complicated with the arrival of ten new EU members in May 2004. Both the EU and NATO are becoming increasingly unwieldy and less able to act swiftly and resolutely in a crisis. But NATO has more chance of acting decisively, because of US leadership and the absence of the more paci? st EU neutrals (Austria, Finland, Ireland and, to a lesser extent, Sweden). In addition, most EU member-states have only limited experience of war-? ghting. W ith the exception of France, the enthusiasm in some 16 A European way of warCan the EU develop an effective military doctrine? 17 capitals for the Ã¢â¬ËEuropeanisationÃ¢â¬â¢ of national armed forces too often appears to be directly related to a deep reluctance to use military force. Belgium is the most conspicuous example of this tendency. Only Britain and France have recently had substantial military experience. Only London and Paris have had to think about the demands of high-octane missions. For example, aside from contributing to various military coalitions, Britain sent troops to Sierra Leone in 2000, while France deployed soldiers on its own to the Ivory Coast in 2002.Other EU member-states have participated in coalition wars or in peacekeeping operations Ã¢â¬â which have sometimes been quite bruising experiences. And many EU governments are making substantial contributions to operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq. But a serious military doctrine should not on ly re? ect combat experience but also command experience. Countries like Germany and Spain are going through a useful military reform process, but their national doctrines remain limited compared to those of Britain and France, because they have less experience of commanding larger units of troops.Much contemporary warfare is against opponents which do not represent a direct existential threat, as did the Soviet Union, but rather cause chaos in the more fragile parts of the world. There may be a variety of reasons why one EU government might feel obliged to get involved in a con? ict (such as lingering post-colonial ties), but equally many reasons why others might not. At present, there is no consensus in Europe on the purpose or the circumstances in which it is appropriate to use military force. There is, therefore, a risk that even if the EU had a military doctrine, re? cting the partial views and meagre capabilities of most of its member-states, the governments would not agree on whether to participate in, or on how to conduct future EU operations. For some countries, like France and Austria, an EU brand might legitimise a military doctrine and future operations; but for others, such as Denmark and some of the new EU members, it could have the opposite effect. For all these reasons, any attempt to turn the EU into a proper military organisation with a shared doctrine is bound to end in failure.However, a European approach to warfare does not have to be an EU approach. Instead, Europe could develop a Ã¢â¬Ëway of warÃ¢â¬â¢ that builds on the experience of the major European military powers, namely Britain and France. There is something distinctive about the demanding nature of their past experiences and present contributions which could be a model for the rest of Europe. Furthermore, those European countries that have actively participated in recent operations, such as Spain, Italy, Poland and the Netherlands, also share this distinctive approach, at leas t to some degree.Most wars are now fought by Ã¢â¬Ëcoalitions of the willingÃ¢â¬â¢. International institutions Ã¢â¬â the United Nations, NATO or the EU Ã¢â¬â endow a degree of legitimacy on such coalitions, but do not run major wars themselves. The NATO management of the 1999 Kosovo war may be the exception that proves the rule. The real question is which governments are ready to join a coalition to address a particular emergency. A key aspect of the answer to that question is the likely role that the US would play in leading such coalitions. American military doctrine is dysfunctionalUS military doctrine has become increasingly dysfunctional. The principal reason is the changed nature of modern warfare, rather than the convoluted political process in Washington. European commentators often make the mistake of comparing de? ciencies in their own decision-making procedures to the complex and often acrimonious inter-agency process in Washington. The delays and confusion that the Washington process can cause are often serious. But there is an important difference with Europe: in the US there is a single decision-maker Ã¢â¬â the president Ã¢â¬â who serves as the ? nal arbiter.All US armed services Ã¢â¬â Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines Ã¢â¬â have developed their own doctrines, often with scant regard for each 18 A European way of war Can the EU develop an effective military doctrine? 19 other. Nevertheless, ever since the US withdrawal from Vietnam in 1975, an underlying assumption has given coherence and continuity to American military thinking. The fundamental assumption guiding the Pentagon is that US armed forces should prepare for wars against other major powers. All other types of operation are secondary ones which America should, if at all possible, avoid. From this assumption ? ws the reason that American doctrine has become dysfunctional: straightforward conventional wars against major powers are becoming a rarity, while complicated small wars are becoming more common. There are two specific reasons behind the failure of existing American doctrine. First, the energy and resources which the Pentagon devotes to conventional forces have reached a point of diminishing marginal returns. Second, the Pentagon has spent too little effort on training soldiers for those unconventional operations that it dismissed as non-core business, but which are increasingly dominating AmericaÃ¢â¬â¢s military efforts.The recent US-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrated that: ? ? ? with increasing accuracy. This means that the network of overseas bases which the US established in Europe during the Cold War is becoming redundant. As a consequence, allies are often considered to be something of a nuisance, demanding major political inputs in return for minor military outputs. Donald 9 US Department of Defense Rumsfeld, the US Secretary of Defense, has News Brie? ng in Warsaw with observed that in the current era the mission Secr etary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, September 25th 2002. hould determine the coalition, rather than the other way around. 9 NATOÃ¢â¬â¢s Kosovo war did much to shape AmericaÃ¢â¬â¢s attitudes towards its allies. NATO tried to achieve its objectives through an air campaign, which led to an exaggerated perception of the disparity between American and European military capabilities. Europeans could barely muster 15 per cent of the total air sorties. But to the intense irritation of the Americans, this gap did not stop the Europeans from demanding a big say over the selection of targets and the overall course of the war. The largest transatlantic row occurred when the British overnment pushed for a commitment to use ground troops if the air campaign continued to fail to produce results. The Clinton administration was deeply reluctant to pay a domestic political price for such a land campaign. It feared that US public opinion would be unwilling to tolerate even modest casualties for what would be seen as marginal foreign policy objectives. Only BritainÃ¢â¬â¢s promise to commit up to 50,000 troops to an eventual land operation began to ease US objections. conventional victories are relatively easy to accomplish; the West can easily achieve air dominance; and the key military tests are increasingly found on the ground.In terms of conventional warfare, the US is now in a class of its own. This is hardly surprising since the US defence budget is equivalent to what the rest of the world spends collectively on defence. America also spends its defence money far more ef? ciently than European governments do. Even so, to occupy a country the size of Iraq with effectively only three combat divisions (each with between 10,000 and 18,000 soldiers), as the US did in April 2003, is remarkable. Furthermore, recent advances in defence technology have allowed American commanders to project lethal power over great distances EU defence: too much process, not enough outputTransatlan tic arguments over the Kosovo campaign had a major impact on European attitudes towards a common defence policy. By the end of the 1992-95 Bosnian war, European leaders were concerned about the United StatesÃ¢â¬â¢ limited commitment to resolving European con? icts. On the eve of the Kosovo war, in December 1998, British Prime Minister Tony Blair and French President Jacques Chirac held a summit at St Malo. They identi? ed a way 20 A European way of war Can the EU develop an effective military doctrine? 21 See Gilles Andreani, Christoph Bertram and Charles Grant, Ã¢â¬ËEuropeÃ¢â¬â¢s military revolutionÃ¢â¬â¢, CER, 2001. 10 orward for European defence and the Kosovo war initially accelerated that process. 10 However, FrancoBritish momentum was soon lost, and subsequent events Ã¢â¬â in particular the quarrels over Iraq Ã¢â¬â have highlighted once again the differences of view between Paris and London. The core issue in EuropeÃ¢â¬â¢s defence debates is what relationship E urope should have with the US. To simplify somewhat Ã¢â¬â but not excessively Ã¢â¬â the French believe Europe must raise its military game to provide a counterweight to the US. The main objective for the British is to be taken seriously in Washington and get a hearing for European views.In their respective approaches, the British have been more consistent. If there has been a British approach to warfare for the past 60 years, it has been to gear military capabilities to the level that is necessary to gain an entree into WashingtonÃ¢â¬â¢s decisionmaking processes. France, however, has fluctuated between its readiness to embrace an alliance with the US and its desire to develop alternatives. The problem for the French is that they cannot balance American power on their own, so they need to propose a mission for Europe as a whole.The French have often tried to get other European countries to sign up to this kind of project. But the countries that are inclined to support France do not possess substantial military assets and experience. This strategy looks forlorn unless Britain, EuropeÃ¢â¬â¢s only other serious military power, collaborates with France. For both the French and the British, the improvement of European military capabilities is a necessary condition for further progress Ã¢â¬â either to convince the Americans that their European allies can bring some hardware to the decision-making table, or else to set the foundations for an alternative to NATO.The St Malo compromise also shows the limits of both the British and French positions. Blair agreed that the Europeans should be able to act without the Americans in contingencies involving neighbourhood crises Ã¢â¬â although he assumed that the US would agree that the EU could use NATO assets. In return, Chirac accepted that the EU could not credibly expect to duplicate NATOÃ¢â¬â¢s planning and command capabilities. The Iraq row has not been fatal to the European defence initiative. A more se rious problem for the EU is that its defence policy will lack substance without extra military capabilities Ã¢â¬â and these have yet to materialise.European countries cannot move 11 Seven European substantial forces with speed to anywhere governments are buying outside Europe. Only Britain has any serious, if 180 A-400M transport modest, transport capability Ã¢â¬â while Germany planes but these are short had to use Ukrainian aircraft to carry its troops range rather than long range. Only the UK has to Afghanistan. Some improvements are in long range transport planes train, albeit painfully slowly. For example, the that can carry the ? rst of the A400M transport planes should be heaviest loads. delivered in 2009. 1 These limitations do not make Europe-only operations impossible. But EU missions are either going to be small, and in effect Britishled and/or French-led, or the Europeans will have to rely upon American support, as they do in the Balkans. At the moment, EU defence p olicy gives the impression of being yet another European initiative bogged down in endless and largely pointless wrangles about process. To sceptics, the defence debates in Brussels have little to do with preparing for warfare, and more to do with reviving a ? agging European political project.This explains why the key innovations in EU defence policy tend to be about setting up new institutions in Brussels, rather than defence ministries buying new equipment. This general preoccupation in European capitals with form rather than content was evident in the debate over planning cells in 2003. In April of that year, France and Germany (together with Belgium and Luxembourg) proposed a European planning cell that would operate separately from NATOÃ¢â¬â¢s command structures Ã¢â¬â to the intense annoyance of EuropeÃ¢â¬â¢s Atlanticist countries such as Britain. 22 A European way of warCan the EU develop an effective military doctrine? 23 In December 2003, EU governments agreed that t he EU would deploy a small group of operational planners to SHAPE, NATOÃ¢â¬â¢s planning headquarters near Mons. This group will work on ensuring a smooth relationship between the EU and NATO on Ã¢â¬ËBerlin-plusÃ¢â¬â¢ missions, when the EU borrows NATO assets. There will also be a new unit of about 30 operational planners for the EUÃ¢â¬â¢s military staff, which currently consists mainly of Ã¢â¬Ëstrategic plannersÃ¢â¬â¢ (their job is to advise EU foreign ministers on the operational plans that may come out of SHAPE or a national military headquarters).The new unit will help with the planning of EU military and civilian missions which involve policemen. Given that there are very few places where Europeans could even think of acting militarily without a benign US attitude, and probably American logistical and intelligence support, the point of the Franco-German proposal was unclear. The fact that such proposals irritate Washington may be a bonus for some in Paris and Berlin, but it also strengthens the perception that the purpose of European defence policy has little to do with how armed forces might actually be used. articipated in operations abroad. Germany is an interesting example of this reform process. At the end of 2003 the German government decided to shift the focus of its defence planning from territorial defence towards acting overseas. By 2010 Germany will have a 35,000-strong Ã¢â¬ËinterventionÃ¢â¬â¢ force for combat operations and a 70,000-strong Ã¢â¬ËstabilisationÃ¢â¬â¢ force for peacekeeping. To pay for this, the Germans are Ã¢â¬â sensibly Ã¢â¬â getting rid of large stocks of weapons designed for con? icts that are now unlikely to materialise.There is little point in any European country maintaining large numbers of aircraft that can deliver only Ã¢â¬ËdumbÃ¢â¬â¢ bombs. The question of how European armies should work with American forces is crucial for the development of a European approach to warfare. But the terms of t he EuropeansÃ¢â¬â¢ defence debate need to change. In particular they need to get away from taking American military prowess as the standard by which all others are judged. There are three reasons for this. First, there are very few contingencies in which the Europeans could contemplate ? hting a major war without the US. The most serious military scenarios would be in Asia Ã¢â¬â such as a future con? ict involving China. In these circumstances, it is inconceivable that European governments would act independently of the US. Moreover, when the Europeans did work with the Americans in a conventional war, the added value would be largely political rather than military. Second, comparing European military power with the US is both misleading and irrelevant. The massive American defence effort sets an impossible standard for Europeans to meet.European governments should not try to match the extravagant US force structure. Nevertheless, Europeans do need to fulfil their past promises to improve military capabilities, so that they they are not caught short in some future emergency. Crucially, this does not require a large additional financial commitment from European governments. The way forward for European defence Any attempt by governments to draw up an EU military doctrine would be fraught and probably futile. Instead, Britain and France should lead Europe in developing a European approach to warfare that is based on their recent campaigns.Other European states would have to be involved in that process, and be prepared to contribute. In many respects, British and French doctrine is already quite mature and well geared for contemporary international conditions, especially when the task involves irregular war in weak or failing states. The British operation in Sierra Leone in 2000 and the French mission to the Ivory Coast in 2002 are examples of the types of operation which the EU can expect to undertake in the near future. Furthermore, British and French doct rine has already had a significant influence on those other EU countries that have 4 A European way of war Can the EU develop an effective military doctrine? 25 Furthermore, there is not going to be a transatlantic war, and the Europeans and Americans need to be able to work together. The surge in American military technology does create new problems for Europeans trying to work alongside American soldiers on the ground. However, European governments should aim to develop armies that complement the US armed forces rather than copy them. Europeans will only act alone in those contingencies where the Americans do not see much of a role for themselves.Europeans cannot work directly against the Americans, or even take action in the face of deep American objections Ã¢â¬â though the Americans can act against European objections. Unless a well-armed rogue state emerges near Europe, such as a nuclear-armed Iran, the most likely opponents of the EU will be in Africa or the Middle East and will have weak air defences. Such opponents would not be a serious match for European forces, especially if the Americans were assisting with logistics and intelligence. It is true that the Europeans could not have fought the Kosovo war without the US, at least not in the way the Americans fought it.But European governments could have fought that war differently, with a greater stress from the start on preparations for a land war. A modest number of high quality aircraft, especially in combination with welltrained professional forces, can be extremely effective. For example, during the 1980s the Iranians spent six years outside Basra, unable to make headway against the Iraqi defences. In 2003, the British spent about eight days in that position. The conclusion is clear: Europeans do not have to ? ght as Americans. Even if they wanted to, it would be totally beyond their capabilities.But more importantly, in many contemporary con? icts they are better off ? ghting the European way. The third reason for not trying to copy the US is the dysfunctional nature of American military doctrine. Contemporary American doctrine focuses on Ã¢â¬Ëbig threatsÃ¢â¬â¢ and prepares US armed forces for capital-intensive rather than labour-intensive wars. But the conventional war stage of a conflict is shrinking, while the unconventional war stage which follows is expanding. Examples of this phenomenon are high-intensity policing in the Balkans, peacekeeping in Afghanistan, and the counter-insurgency operations in Iraq.Impressive US strides in conventional warfare are due to American cultural impatience; a political preference for quick results and technology-based solutions; and the PentagonÃ¢â¬â¢s desire to use maximum resources to keep casualties to a minimum. Irregular warfare requires more patience and puts greater pressures on frontline troops and junior of? cers. Soldiers also have to co-ordinate their efforts with aid workers and diplomats, as well as quell social unr est. In these cases, the enemy understands that it will be overwhelmed in regular war. But, with a determination ? ed by nationalism, ethnic vulnerability or ideology, the enemy can embarrass the Americans by adopting traditional insurgent tactics. Iraq is a particularly challenging example, for very speci? c historical reasons. The Iraq experience is posing the biggest test to American military prowess since Vietnam Ã¢â¬â although it is not of the same proportions. The Americans have suffered heavily from a ? xation with force protection, which often leads to over-reaction by soldiers that pushes insurgents and locals together. A comparison between the American counter-insurgency operation in Baghdad and the British one in Basra in 2003-04 ? tters the British, because of the much more favourable political climate in southern Iraq. Nonetheless, it reinforces the view that the British have a better approach to this sort of campaign, in particular by understanding the importance of separating the insurgents and the local population. It is fair to say that Europeans are more skilled at this sort of campaign, in part because of the tradition of imperial policing, but also because of their more recent and extensive experience of peacekeeping. Because todayÃ¢â¬â¢s opponents are more likely to specialise in guerrilla warfare than tanks and aircraft, there is now a paradoxical situation. 6 A European way of war The United StatesÃ¢â¬â¢ reluctance to engage in unconventional wars has constrained its surplus of power. Both the Clinton and, initially, the Bush administrations sought to dampen expectations that the US would be willing and able to sort out every local con? ict. They were especially fearful of being drawn into a series of inconclusive and domestically unpopular foreign entanglements. But the events of September 11th 2001 created new imperatives for American activism. Washington now has major commitments in Afghanistan and Iraq, and is ? nding it harde r to limit those commitments.The days when the Pentagon could insist that it would not enter a con? ict without a clear exit strategy, and then pass on the thankless and demanding task of nation-building to others, have passed. This is already starting to have important consequences for doctrine development in the US. The Iraq experience shows that a new con? ict sequence is developing in which the length of the actual war is contracting, because there are few likely enemies able to withstand intense and precise ? repower. But the post-war activity, which can be both tough and deadly, may stretch out almost inde? itely. The key question is not whether the Europeans can adapt to American doctrine, but whether the Americans can adapt to the European way of war. 3 The Ã¢â¬ËEuropean Security StrategyÃ¢â¬â¢ is not a security strategy Francois Heisbourg At the Brussels summit in December 2003, European Union governments adopted a document entitled Ã¢â¬Å"A secure Europe in a better wo rldÃ¢â¬ and subtitled Ã¢â¬Å"European Security StrategyÃ¢â¬ (hereafter referred to as the ESS). 12 In the spring of 2003, the governments had given the EUÃ¢â¬â¢s High Representative for foreign policy, Javier Solana, a mandate to draw up this document.